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Whenever we are dealing with the “modern,” it is always interesting to know 
whether that which makes reference to its own contemporaneity and pleads for 
cohabitation with us is a transcending of the old with new means, or whether 
its novelty lies merely in preparing the terrain for the old to be suitably conclud-
ed. Such knowledge, however, cannot be obtained without analyzing concrete 
events and studying their consequences. And since the term “modernism” ap-
peared as a theoretical reaction to the modernist “state of affairs” in the same 
way as sight appeared as an evolutionary reaction to the existence of sunlight 
and not vice versa, I shall attempt to explore the nature of the modernist “way 
of being” and evaluate it to a certain extent in the phenomenal field of fine/
plastic art. In doing so I shall focus on the period between the mid-nineteenth 
century, when bourgeois art with its routine realist approaches drifted into a 
strange state of unresponsiveness to the world around it; on the 1960s, when 
the modernist model of aesthetic idealism found itself in a deep crisis; and on 
the 1970s and 1980s, when, owing to its inability to continue advancing in the 
same idealist direction, it became necessary to test the very “seismic stability” 
of modernist suppositions by demystifying the aesthetic and the sublime. As 
far as fine/plastic art is concerned, this was the time of a double shift of para-
digms, one of which served to mobilize secular metaphysics, and the other of 
which aimed to verify its foundations in conditions of a globalizing culture. The 
first case involves the transition of the paradigm of fine art into the paradigm of 
“pure” plastic art, and the second focuses on the transition from the paradigm 
of “pure plastic art” to the paradigm of visual art, whose asset is “secondary 
semantization” of visual objects, events and contexts. For a precise discussion, 
a more than century-long time interval seems exaggerated, yet its selection was 
necessary because the paradigmatic shifts that I would like to coherently thema-
tize are not visible in thinner temporal slices. Indeed, the consequences of such 
a decision undoubtedly call for obligatory conciseness in the verbalization of 
conceptual and articulatory transformations. 
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1. Modernism as the mobilization of metaphysical background
In medias res
In the second half of the nineteenth century, bourgeois art of the realist genre 
practically came to a standstill on the formative standards of naturalist iconog-
raphy and mimetics. Yet this extensive situation no longer befitted social hap-
penings, whose speed was then being set by the first industrial revolution, by 
primary accumulation of capital and by fierce market competitiveness, nor by 
the creative potentials of artists who, confronted with the emerging photogra-
phy, attempted to surpass the attained mimetic-documentary standards and 
thereby pave the way for painting. 
The flexibility and instability of modern society acquired the initial external 
expression in Impressionism. Impressionists abandoned their dark studios 
adorned with artificially arranged motifs and headed out into the plein air, 
into the air and light, where, through direct experience, they encountered a 
fast-moving and disarranged life. Their paintings were composed in a sketchy 
way, because they wanted to capture the fleeting moment of life. This gave them 
freshness. Their painting procedure involved the optical mixing of colors (divi-
sionism), which at the time was simultaneously being discovered by science.1 
This brought color to Impressionist works, as well as “scientific validity.” Re-
ferring to science was also a sign of modern times. In doing so Impressionists 
strove to emphasize that their paintings were “more truthful” than those of Nat-
uralist painters, since the Impressionist “truth” was supported by science, then 
considered the only solid and supreme authority. 
This Impressionist “scientific truth” ipso facto made two methodological 
moves that were of key importance for the further development of fine/plastic 
art in the twentieth century: (a) On the basis of scientific findings about the 
optical mixing of colors and the simultaneous contrast, Impressionism broke 
down the appearance of truth into its optical components, into dot formations 
of pure colors.2 This pointed to a modernist interest in the “background” of the 
1 Cf. Michel-Eugène Chevreul, Du contraste simultané des couleurs et de lʼassortiment des 
objets colorés, Paris: Pitois-Levrault, 1839, 1-16, 145-275 and 623-655 (quoted from: http://
goo.gl/nhvykL; accessed in April 2014).
2 This principle can be observed today with a magnifying glass in color rasters used in photo 
print reproduction.
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world, which later developed into a modernist axiom. (b) The second move in-
volved redirecting attention from the imitative aspects of depiction to the free 
production or synthetization of the visual, which subsequently also developed 
into a modernist axiom and opened the path to non-figurative or abstract art. 
This transition was explicitly contextualized by the painter Fernand Léger in 
his essay, “The Origins of Painting and Its Representational Value,” in which 
he wrote: 
The impressionists were the first to reject the absolute value of the subject and to 
consider its value to be merely relative. That is the tie that links and explains the 
entire modern evolution. The impressionists are the great originators of the pre-
sent movement; they are its primitives in the sense that, wishing to free them-
selves from the imitative aspect, they considered painting for its color only, ne-
glecting all form and all line almost entirely. […] The imitation of the subject that 
their work still involves is thus, even then, no more than a pretext for variety, a 
theme and nothing more. For the impressionists a green apple on a red rug is no 
longer the relationship between two objects, but the relationship between two 
tones, a green and a red. When this truth became formulated in living works, 
the present movement was inevitable. I particularly stress this epoch of French 
painting, for I think it is at this precise moment that the two great pictorial con-
cepts, visual realism and realism of conception, meet—the first completing its 
ascent, which includes all traditional painting down to the impressionists, and 
the second, realism of conception, beginning with them.3
The distinction between “visual realism” and “realism of conception,” as well 
as the artistic preference for the latter, were adopted and applied in their own 
way by post-Impressionist movements such as Fauvism, Expressionism, Cub-
ism and Constructivism, all of which believed that the appearance of a thing is 
not the only reality, but that behind this appearance there exists an “invisible 
reality” which artists need to follow to a greater degree than the reality of ap-
pearance. Or, in the words of Wassily Kandinsky: Art has abandoned the skin of 
nature, but not its laws, its cosmic laws.4 These laws were the laws of the plastic 
means of expression, that is, the laws of the visual perception and ontic analysis 
3 Fernand Léger, “Les origines de la peinture et sa valeur representative” (1913), in Fernand 
Léger, Functions of Painting, London: Thames and Hudson, 1973, 3-4.
4 Wassily Kandinsky, Essays über Kunst und Künstler, Bern: Benteli Verlag, 1963, 203.
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of space, which the painters of the first decade of the twentieth century passion-
ately explored in order to find legitimation and solidity at least in the founda-
tions of their art (see Figure 1), if such solidity and trust could not be offered to 
them by the unstable economic and strained political situation in Europe of that 
time, which was rapidly sliding into the First World War.
“Art does not reproduce the visible; rather, it makes visible.”5
Klee’s famous statement quoted above concisely summarizes the Impressionist 
discovery that art is not formed according to nature, it does not only reproduce 
its appearance (although it can), but also creates from its own elements (light-
dark, color, point, line) and follows its own principles, in a manner analogous to 
nature. The realization that the artist may abandon the “united states of appear-
ance” and independently create the appearance of the not-yet-visible opened 
new and promising paths of creative freedom to the artists of that time. They 
enthusiastically began to explore the new world that was simultaneously open-
ing outwards, into the background of the world (into the objective), and inwards 
5 “Kunst gibt nicht das Sichtbare wieder, sondern macht sichtbar,” Paul Klee, “Schöpfer-
ische Konfession” (1920), in Paul Klee Kunst-Lehre. Aufsätze, Vorträge, Rezensionen und 
Beiträge zur bildnerischen Formenlehre, ed. Günther Regel, Leipzig: Reclam, 1987, 60.
Figure 1: Bart van der Leck, Still life with 
a wine bottle, 1922; Otterlo: Kröller-Müller 
Museum.
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(into one’s own subjectivity), while the brave new world of social life was be-
coming increasingly darkened in the shadow of the anticipated economic crisis. 
The artist, now pushed to the edge of society by the bourgeoisie and capital, 
was becoming a recluse, a meditator, and above all a seeker of experiential and 
life harmony which the current world of techno-politics was unable to provide. 
The abstract art appearing between 1909 and 1919 was an attempt by artists to 
capture, in a constructive way, a balance between the subjective and the objec-
tive that did not exist in the social conditions of that time. The assembly line, 
which degraded man to the level of an extension of a machine, was a production 
necessity, yet it implicitly caused great imbalance in man’s creative identity and 
capacity. It needed to be compensated for, and artists spontaneously reacted 
to this imbalance. By articulating an abstract painting from pure plastic con-
structive elements in which forms began to live their own life in an orderly and 
logical composition, the artist created a symbolic image of what human life is 
supposed to be—that is, the image of man as the creator of meaning.
From plastic art to pure plastic art
Many artists of abstraction, particularly geometric abstraction, stepped onto 
this constructive and synthetic path; in these endeavors, the most in-depth and 
regulative course was taken by the movements of Suprematism and Neoplasti-
cism and the artists associated with them, such as Kazimir Malevich, El Lissitzky 
and Piet Mondrian. These artists strove—either through “intuitive sensibility” 
(Suprematism) or through a kind of rationalized plastic Neoplatonism (Neoplas-
ticism)—toward objective and universal beauty, and for this very reason attempt-
ed to break away from the spheres of singularity, particularity, randomness and 
subjective judgment. The artist of Suprematism and De Stijl subordinated him-
self entirely to the high idealism of pure, prototypical shapes and to the search 
for purified, objective and universal beauty (Figure 2). Or, as Piet Mondrian de-
fined this endeavor in his essay “Plastic and Pure Plastic Art” (1937):
Precisely by its existence, non-figurative art shows that “art” continues always on 
its true road. It shows that “art” is not the expression of the appearance of reality 
such as we see it, nor of the life which we live, but that it is the expression of true re-
ality and true life […] indefinable, but realizable through the plastic. Thus, we must 
carefully distinguish between two kinds of reality; one which has an individual 
and one which has a universal appearance. In art, the former is the expression of 
space determined by particular things or forms, the latter establishes expansion 
52
jožef muhovič
and limitation—the creative factors of space—through neutral forms, free lines 
and pure colors. While universal reality arises from determinate relations, particu-
lar reality shows only veiled relations. The latter must obviously be confused in 
just that respect in which universal reality is bound to be clear.6
6 Piet Mondrian, Plastic and Pure Plastic Art (1937), in The New Art—The New Life: The Col-
lected Writings of Piet Mondrian, eds. H. Holtzmann and M. S. James, London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1986, 297.
Figure 2: Piet Mondrian, Composition C 
(no. III), with Red, Yellow and Blue, 1935, Oil 
on canvas, 56,2 x 55,1 cm; private collection 
(on loan to Tate Gallery London, 2012).
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Pure plastic art thus functions as an agent of “enlightenment,” with the help of 
which permanent spiritual light falls through fleeting appearances into “eter-
nal structures.” Its goal is to transcend the world of appearance; to turn away 
from the intrusive, confusing and turbulent surface of things; to perceive with a 
spiritualized eye their “essence,” their “pure” formative values, structures and 
relations; and to reproduce them in a spirit and sense accessible form. And all of 
this was the work of artists who still believed in the values of classical European 
humanism and who were merely attempting to infuse non-figurative art with 
“Renaissance aesthetics” and all its faith in the lawfulness of the world and in 
science, in the immanent logic of artistic means of expression, in man’s creative 
and metaphysical potentials. The abstraction appearing in 1910 represented the 
disintegration of interest in the material world, but not its ontic background. 
The artists of abstraction attempted to return art to its former splendor and life 
potency. But the subsequent development of economic relations that culminat-
ed in the economic crisis of 1929 brutally crushed their expectations.
From Europe to the USA, or: from the aesthetic background of the world to the 
sublime background of the subject
A thorn of doubt had thus been planted in the flesh of Western culture regard-
ing the possibility of its renewal on old, Antiquity-Renaissance foundations. Yet 
at that time its pressure was not strong enough to deter artistic explorations in 
the direction of mobilizing the metaphysical background of reality. Constructivist 
and Purist endeavors survived the economic crisis, the rise of Nazism, and the 
atrocities of the Second World War. But due to the pre-war (and also partly post-
war) migrations of European artists to the USA and because of the specific circum-
stances existing in Europe after the Second World War (destruction, division by 
the Iron Curtain), these endeavors grew stronger branches in their new, American 
homeland.7 This occurred in movements such as American geometric abstrac-
tion, abstract expressionism, color field painting, hard edge painting, etc. Mod-
ernism as an endeavor to transform the explicit into the implicit, and to pull the 
background into the foreground, modified the driving force in its American ver-
sion. If Constructivism was—generally speaking—driven by endeavors, impreg-
nated with mysticism and theosophy, to uncover the metaphysical background 
7 Willem de Kooning emigrated in 1926; Hans Hofmann in 1932; Josef Albers, Walter Gro-
pius, László Moholy-Nagy and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe in 1933; Piet Mondrian in 1940; 
and others.
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of the world and express itself with the pure forms and cosmic laws derived from 
it, then post-Second World War American abstract painting was characterized 
by post-metaphysical endeavors for the plastic uncovering of the background of 
human striving for the superlative, which is generally designated with the term 
“sublime.” In his essay “The Sublime Is Now” (1948), Barnett Newman revealed 
that in the procedures of this endeavor, the sublime was secularized:
Instead of making cathedrals out of Christ, man, or “life,” we are making it out of 
ourselves, out of our own feelings.8
The sublime as it appears in the works of the most prominent representatives of 
American post-war abstract art is metaphysical, transcendent—not by its (objec-
tivist) attitude towards the world, but in its (subjectivist) attitude towards man 
as an agent of (self-)transcending desires, experiences and feelings. It generally 
has two modalities: that of minimalism, where the elementariness, primacy and 
“openness” of the result, i.e. its “here and now,” is esteemed as an intellectual 
virtue;9 and that of abstract expression, which attempts to be man’s intimate 
partner in his striving for intensified sublime experiences and a personally 
motivated “empathy” (Einfühlung) with things, the spirit of the times, and art-
works.10 A typical example of the first modality is the work of Barnett Newman 
(cf. Vir Heroicus Sublimis from 1950-51; Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue? 
from 1966, etc.), while a typical example of the second modality is the work of 
Mark Rothko (especially that from after 1948).11
8 Barnett Newman, “The Sublime Is Now” (1948), in Theories of Modern Art: A Source Book 
by Artists and Critics, eds. H. B. Chipp, P. Selz, and J. C. Taylor, Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1984, 553.
9 Jean-François Lyotard wrote, with respect to Newman’s painting Vir Heroicus Sublimis, the 
following: “A canvas by Newman draws a contrast between stories and its plastic nudity. 
Everything is there—dimensions, colours, lines—but there are no allusions. So much so 
that it is a problem for the commentator. What can one say that is not given? […] The best 
gloss consists of the question: what can one say? Or of the exclamation ‘Ah’. Of surprise: 
‘Look at that.’ So many expressions of a feeling which does have a name in the modern 
aesthetic tradition (and in the work of Newman): the sublime. It is a feeling of ‘there’ 
(Voilà),” Lyotard, “Newman: The Instant,” in The Lyotard Reader and Guide, eds. Keith 
Crome and James Williams, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 331.
10 Cf. Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraktion und Einfühlung, München: Piper, 1907.
11 “A picture lives by companionship, expanding and quickening in the eyes of the sensitive 
observer. It dies by the same token. It is therefore a risky and unfeeling act to send it out 
into the world. How often it must be permanently impaired by the eyes of the vulgar and 
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The question is, however, how long can such linear plastic self-transcending in 
the direction of minimalism and abstract expression last. It seemed that after 
1950, by constantly appealing to the viewer’s “sensitiveness” and “subtleness” 
(cf. fn 11), the secularly sublime was demanding, with each passing day, in-
creasingly greater experiential, intellectual and volitional concessions.
2. Crisis of aesthetic idealism and the turn to secondary 
semantization12
In the 1960s, modernist art came to an obvious crisis that was reflected in an 
aversion to the constitutive modernist idea that, behind the appearance of 
things, there exists a self-dependent metaphysical world of “pure” formative 
values, structures and relations, i.e. a subtle, post-metaphysical “other world” 
of sublime experiences, and that leading to all of this was an abstract mor-
phology transcending the appearance of the world with its purist geometry and 
all-over expression. Although a reaction to the not-too-convincing metaphysics 
of “purity” had already emerged in early modernism with Duchamp and the 
Dadaists, it disappeared in an “unripe time.”13 This demystifying gesture had 
been aroused from self-absorption in the late 1950s by Neo-Dadaism, which de-
veloped from the anti-idealist spirit of the New Left, and in particular from the 
auto-reflexive epicenter of American abstract painting, which, in exploring the 
formative foundations of painting, began to touch its extreme (physical, fac-
tual, material) boundaries.14
the cruelty of the impotent who would extend the affliction universally.”—Rothko, quoted 
in Barbara Hess, Abstract Expressionism, New York: Taschen, 2005, 42.
12 For more detail, cf. Jožef Muhovič, “Über das Geistige in der Kunst heute oder: An den 
Wurzeln der Diskurs (ohn)mächte,” in: Gorazd Kocijančič, Vid Snoj, Jožef Muhovič, Über 
das Geistige in de Kunst—zum zweiten Mal, LIT-Verlag, Münster—Wien—Berlin 2010, 51-102.
13 Primarily because history has proven that the Duchampian ready-mades and the Dadaistic 
dismantlings of meaning do not hold ground as the movens of de-aestheticization, but 
spontaneously fall into a perpetuation of their own alternative—aestheticization. Cf. Du-
champ’s statement: “I threw the bottle dryer and urinal into their face as a challenge, and 
now they’re admiring them as something aesthetically beautiful.”—Duchamp, quoted in 
Hans Richter, Dada—Kunst und Antikunst, Köln: DuMont, 1964, 212.
14 Its protagonists were the American Neo-Dadaists (Jasper Johns, Robert Rauschenberg; ear-
lier John Cage in music) and the French “new Realists” (Arman, Yves Klein, Daniel Spoerri).
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Collapse of Aesthetic Difference
When we say that a painting “presents” or “makes visible” something or other, 
this means that it actively shows the appearance—or disappearance—of the vis-
ibility (Sichtbarkeit) of something. In brief, such painting makes visibility a pro-
cess that unwinds before the eyes and spirit of viewers. 
What the material existence of the painting (signifier) shows and what the painting 
itself means (signified) differ. And precisely this inseparably linked discrepancy of 
signified and signifier is the simplest definition of such a painting. This “idealist” 
Figure 3: Robert Ryman, Untitled, 1964, vinyl 
polymer paint on aluminum, 18 x 18 x 7/8 in. 
(45,7 x 45,7 x 2,2 cm); private collection.
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transcendence of the signifier by the signified became increasingly more suspi-
cious in the anti-representational paintings of the 1960s (Robert Morris, Barnett 
Newman, Ad Reinhardt). The image, appearance and reference were denounced 
as illusionism and delusion, while minimalist painting (e.g. Frank Stella, Robert 
Ryman) was freely moving the weights on the scales of aesthetic relationships 
toward the objective, factual, material side (Figure 3). In other words: in an au-
toreflexive and reductionist fever, everything led to the breaking of ties between 
the pictorial signified and the signifier, i.e. to the collapse of aesthetic difference. 
The principal norms of painting are the limiting conditions that need to be ful-
filled by a “surface covered with colors distributed in a certain order” in order 
for it to be perceived and interpreted as a painting.15 Modernism discovered that 
it was not only possible but also necessary to explore the irreducible essence 
of paintings. By now, wrote Clement Greenberg in his essay “Modernist Paint-
ing” in 1962, it has been established, it would seem, that the irreducible essence 
of painting consists in two constitutive norms—flatness and the delimitation of 
flatness—and that the observance of merely these two norms is enough to create 
an object which can be experienced as a “picture.” The question posed by art is 
no longer the question of what constitutes painting or art, but rather what con-
stitutes irreducibly good art as such. Yet it was precisely at this point that things 
became complicated for Greenberg. A monochrome, flat surface seen as limited 
and different from the wall could, based on the minimal conditions of limitation 
and flatness, be declared a painting, or even art,16 but the question was whether 
it could also be declared a “good” painting and therefore “true” art rather than 
just “good design.”17 The material surface that fulfills the formal conditions for 
15 Cf. Maurice Denisʼs famous statement dating from 1890: “Se rappeler qu’un tableau, avant 
d’être un cheval de bataille, une femme nue ou une quelconque anecdote, est essentielle-
ment une surface plane recouverte de couleurs en un certain ordre assemblées.”—Maurice 
Denis, “Définition du Néo-traditionalisme” (1890), reprinted in Maurice Denis, Le ciel et 
lʼArcadie, Paris: Hermann, 1993, 5.
16 “A monochromatic flatness that could be seen as limited in extension and different from 
a wall henceforth automatically declared itself to be a picture, to be art”; Clement Green-
berg, “Recentness of Sculpture” (1967), in Minimal Art. A Critical Anthology, ed. Gregory 
Battcock, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, 181.
17 In the same essay Greenberg suggests that the “aesthetic surprise” a viewer experiences 
on looking at “true” works of art is long lasting and important, while the novelty item pro-
vokes no more than a momentary surprise that is “superfluous.” For Greenberg a “true” 
work of art is a handmade expression of the artist’s feelings and thoughts. Minimalist art 
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a painting does not necessarily also produce aesthetic meaning. Greenberg of-
ten drew attention to the fact that a pictorial non-figurative surface, to which 
he gave absolute priority before the figurative pictorial surface, was something 
entirely different from the material surface of the painterʼs support, although 
the difference between the two was difficult to describe. Greenberg attempted to 
describe it as follows:
The flatness towards which modernist painting orients itself can never be an 
absolute flatness. The heightened sensitivity of the picture plane may no longer 
permit sculptural illusion, or trompe-lʼoeil, but it does and must permit optical 
illusion. […] The first mark made on a canvas destroys its literal and utter flatness, 
and the result of the marks made on it by an artist like Mondrian is still a kind of 
illusion that suggests a kind of third dimension. Only now it is a strictly pictorial, 
strictly optical third dimension. The Old Masters created an illusion of space in 
depth that one could imagine oneself walking into, but the analogous illusion 
created by the modernist painter can only be seen into; can be traveled through, 
literally or figuratively, only with the eye.18
In brief: for a flat surface to be “true” art, its status must—according to Green-
berg—reveal the delicate presence of “aesthetic difference” between the sig-
nified and the signifier. Even more: it must designate their unfamiliarity and 
non-identity, which is a precondition for creating an aesthetic field, an aesthetic 
relationship, and thereby “artistry.”
It is not difficult to imagine that the self-reflexive and reductive impetus of late 
modernist painters could not, in its rush to the foundations of painting, perma-
nently stop at this delicate, hair-thin barrier, but would sooner or later have to 
cross it. And, in the form of radical minimalism, they bid farewell to the tran-
scending “idealism of the spirit” in favor of the “anti-idealism of bare objectiv-
ity.” The shift of attention from meaning to its material infrastructure, from ar-
tefact to fact, from the significance of aesthetic difference to the significance of 
non-difference between the signifier and the signified, was a small step for the 
with its deliberate production of artworks devoid of feeling, such as Donald Judd’s factory 
produced objects, was in fact closer to furniture than to art, and should be viewed as noth-
ing more than “Good Design”; ibid., 185-186.
18 Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” in Esthetics Contemporary, ed. Richard Kostelanetz, 
Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1978, 202. 
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form-generating process, but a giant step for its artistic consequences. If painted 
pictures no longer belong to a different world than their materials, their process 
of creation, their environment, context, institutional framework, etc., then all 
aspects that spatially, temporally, contextually and institutionally surround a 
pictorial work of art can equally and freely enter art.
That is what has actually happened. Paintings that became mere objects, ar-
tifacts that shrunk into facts, and signifieds that sublimated into the bareness 
of the signifier not only turned away from the painting medium that had been 
continuously protected and preserved by the aesthetic idealism of abstract art,19 
but also turned towards a radically different way of communicating meanings. 
Because they do not symbolize anything, they are no longer symbols; since they 
do not depict or represent anything, they are no longer iconic signs; therefore, 
as facts which represent themselves in good and bad, they are entitled only to 
the status of traces, self-exhibitors, indexes.
Objects or phenomena perceived as indexes do not “communicate” or trans-
mit messages in a usual way. They are not messengers of an authorially fixed 
thought, idea or language […] but can, with their semantic openness, be in-
scribed into an indefinite set of interpretative contexts. Simply because they can 
allure or entice a subject to think about them and thus with their self-themati-
zation or self-incontextualization make the subject arrive at their meaning on 
his own. For just as it is possible to secondarily aestheticize optional things if 
these are assessed, in line with the criteria of—more or less reflected—taste, to 
be aesthetic and are accordingly treated as such,20 so too it is possible to sec-
ondarily semanticize optional things (objects, phenomena, contexts) if these 
are placed within the coordinates of the subjective interpretative and meaning-
forming will. In the latter case, we perceive such objects as clues. The objects 
denote nothing (except themselves, of course), but they may nevertheless attach 
to themselves connotations that are dependent on their form, their spatial and 
cultural context, on their use in both contexts, and above all on the will and 
capabilities of the subject semantically exploiting these objects. By definition, 
connotative exertion always surpasses the indexical clue or denotation, usually 
19 Abstract paintings are, in a technical-technological sense, entirely analogous to Renais-
sance paintings (canvas stretched onto subframe, priming, etc.).
20 Compare the aestheticized use of antiquities in modern apartments or the interest in mak-
ing purchases at the flea market.
60
jožef muhovič
in the poetical or rhetorical direction. In brief: within the scope of a doubtful 
analogy, indexically used objects can always be interpreted in different ways in 
art. And since reflection and analytical work in this respect is no longer based 
on a specific aesthetic manner of perception that differs essentially from the 
functional one, but rather on functional identification, the two of them change 
profoundly. Late modernism is no longer familiar with aesthetic perception and 
experiencing in the narrow sense of the word, but has, on the basis of modern 
technical and functional perceptions, developed new methods of perception, 
reflection and analysis; particularly those of functional, cognitive, contextual 
and social-critical provenance (Figure 4).21
As long as an artwork was the result of an author’s aesthetic perception, the 
intention and production that he used to realize the form of his intentional 
“meaning” in the material medium, the most suitable manner of inquiring into 
artworks was hermeneutics—i.e., the reconstruction of the original meaning. In 
a period that does not operate with forms, but rather with indexically-applied 
objects that do not have “authorially fixed meaning,” hermeneutics is off-track. 
Namely, objects that have no immanently fixed meaning, even though they have 
been assembled and set up by artists, have no “lost” or “darkened” original 
meaning (especially not the only one) that needs to be reconstructed. Here, the 
21 Johannes Meinhardt, “Das Verschwinden der ästhetischen Einstellung,” in Kunst und 
Form. Was heisst „Form“ in einer postmodernen Kunst, ed. Jožef Muhovič, Phainomena, 
Ljubljana, XVII (66-67/2008; special issue), 82-85.
Figure 4: Tracey Emin, My Bed, 1998, 
installation; exhibited at the Tate Gallery in 
1999 as one of the shortlisted works for the 
Turner Prize. 
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re-construction of denotative meaning must replace the authoritative de-con-
struction of connotative reference, i.e., “eisegesis.”22
If we do not question their opacity, the indexically appearing objects are revealed 
to us as implications or as chains of implications about which we may draw con-
clusions on the basis of their choice, application, use, and even their own inven-
tion. Late modernism does not put references in brackets, nor does it suspend 
them, but is instead intensely engaged in problematizing the methods of creating 
references, which it does in a predominantly allegorical manner.23An allegorical 
thinker no longer believes in the intentional meaning of what is being offered for 
him to view, but realizes that the manner in which he poses questions will deter-
mine which insights he will gain in connection with certain objects and their con-
stellations. He is also aware of the limitation, questionability and arbitrariness 
of these questions and the dogmaticalness of his replies. An allegorist, says Wal-
ter Benjamin, uses objects or things to a certain extent as indexes which do not 
speak for themselves, but do direct him to situations in reality, especially social 
reality. What he will do with these instructions depends on him alone. Most im-
portant of all: an allegorist asks the world, not intentionally fixed statements. The 
world is what encourages him to reflect; the objects are merely catalysts for his 
questioning.24 In short: the allegorical impulse that marked late modernism is in-
tensely re-directing our experience of art from aesthetic to functional perception 
and from hermeneutic to rhetorical, textual, discursive intercourse with things.25
If the model of aesthetic idealism in plastic art thus presupposed and favored 
authorially semanticized forms with explicit post-metaphysical features, i.e. 
forms which distanced themselves to the greatest possible degree from the de-
lusive “physics” of objectivity and functional perception, then the model of late 
22 To emphasize the difference between the “re-construction” of meaning, which is charac-
teristic of exegesis and hermeneutics, and its de-construction, which is characteristic of 
the interpretation of indexically used objects, I have introduced the inverse expression 
“eisegesis” (Gr. eisegesis), which is normally described in dictionaries as the “subjective, 
dogmatic explanation of sources.”
23 Cf. Craig Owens, “The Allegorical Impulse: Towards a Theory of Postmodernism,” in Art 
after Modernism: Rethinking Representation, ed. Brian Wallis, New York: The New Museum 
of Contemporary Art New York & D. R. Godine Publisher Inc., 1984, 235.
24 Cf. Walter Benjamin, “Das Passagen-Werk,” Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V/1, Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1982, 466. 
25 Ibid., 223.
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modernist indexical semantization turned precisely to what the idealist model 
wished to abandon, that is, to the singularity of the factual and to the func-
tionality of perception. It did so, paradoxically, for the same reason: because of 
the delusiveness of plastically embodied aesthetic idealism. It could therefore 
be said that we are dealing here with the banishment of a too much mystified 
aesthetically-idealist Beelzebub by a demystifying Satan of secondary semanti-
zation. The moving force of this semantization, however, is no longer to func-
tion in the medium of a plastic art that is spontaneously calling for forming 
and trans-forming, for existential participation and creative eros; instead, it is 
to jump out of this medium into the medium of discourse, which is a synonym 
for distance and intellectual meta-position. 
If the artefacts of old, “aesthetic art” (with all of their idealizations) were often 
not only “full of everything conceivable,” but also full of themselves (aesthetic 
autonomism), the (arte)FACTS (objects, events, contexts) of contemporary, “de-
aestheticized art” are intentionally “empty” and thus “open” semantic poten-
tials, and as such they are directly seeking an interpretative (eisegetic: see fn 22) 
impulse for discourse; practically any kind of discourse may be offered to—or 
imposed upon—them as the “most important surrogate of what is most impor-
tant.” Over and over again, since the fluidity and—ultimately—transitoriness of 
discourses cannot prevent the discourses of other interpreters from appearing 
on the scene of semantic openness. And with the same entitlement.
3. Epi-logic:
Modernist heartbeat in the rear-view mirror of art
To determine whether any conclusions can be drawn from the renewed obser-
vance of modernist strategies in the realm of fine/plastic art presented above 
with respect to the nature, scope and topicality or non-topicality of the term 
“modernism,” I shall attempt, in abbreviated form, to summarize the empirical 
“depths” and “reefs” of the modernist model of aesthetic idealism on the one 
side and the model of secondary semantization on the other side.
Added value and the autonomist trap of the aesthetic idealism model
In my opinion, the strong side of the metaphysical orientation of modernist art 
is in its artefactness, in the “drama of formativeness,” that is, in the intention 
to transcend the given, to aim for human self-transcendence, and to create real 
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forms that do not exist in nature but can be produced on the basis of a knowl-
edge of natural laws (cf. footnote 5). Although this intention cannot be realized 
with the same potency in all spiritual-historical circumstances, it is nevertheless 
not possible to imagine human culture entirely without it. It is based on the en-
deavors to pull the background into the foreground and to show a complicated 
life the path to spiritual orderliness and cleanliness. In modernism, this meta-
physical regime interested in background and cleanliness is bound to the super-
lative in all its phases. In this regime, to create what is relevant always means to 
express what is in manʼs conceptions most fundamental, supreme, the best, the 
most lasting, the most complete.
Yet in this optimized human endeavor also lies the greatest danger of the secu-
larized idealist model. Namely, the more a plastic artist looks upwards or down-
wards to the “essential,” the “fundamental” and the “pure,” and on that basis 
attempts to produce “from himself”(cf. footnote 8) still unseen and non-existing 
forms, the deeper he is entering the autonomous realm in which he must de-
termine not only the boundaries, but also the “laws” for his own articulation.26 
This is an exceptional task, within which many creators and even periods “lose 
their nerves” and end up in the blind alley of self-will, which sooner or later 
begins to send them bills of credibility in the form of the most perfidious self-
deception, i.e. in the form of the conviction that whatever is satisfied with itself, 
the world and the times is also the most suitable.27 Consequences of this are fre-
quently fictions or pathetic phantoms of “superpersonal wisdom” which have 
an effect only as long as the viewerʼs conscious will is prepared to credit them in 
the form of a suitable quantum of mystification. When the credit is spent and the 
articulation demystified, the time comes for sobering strategies and the return 
to more realistic possibilities and values. 
Added value and blind spots of the secondary semantization model
Moving away from metaphysical phantoms and fictions understandably leads 
to their de-mystification, de-idealization, and de-universalization. All of this 
in line with Nietzscheʼs and Popperʼs criticism of teleological reason, which 
26 Auto-nomos, he who makes his own laws.
27 Adapted from Peter Sloterdijk, Eurotaoismus: Zur Kritik der politischen Kinetik, Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989, 240: “In diesem Sinn ist politischer Moralismus […] die 
tückischste Form von politischer Blindheit, weil er das, was meint, mit sich selbst zufrieden 
sein können, zugleich auch für weltgerecht halten will.”
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showed that all recognition is of a local nature and that no human observer 
can reach the stage where he actually transcends his own position. From this 
perspective the purpose of contemporary visual art (objects, installations, new 
media, activism, etc.) based on secondary semantization is not in absorbing 
oneself in visual objects, events and contexts, and transcending them in order 
to please this or that super-personal “wisdom”; its purpose is not to ignore such 
objects, events and contexts on a personal level, even though they may be “low” 
and ephemeral, but to find them (ready-mades), to put them into focus, to se-
mantically seize them, and to socially exploit them.
The positive side of the turn to factuality, to the de-idealization of human meta-
physical appetites, and to the pragmatization of artistic objects, processes and 
institutions is that contact with the daily routine is preserved, the disarranged 
world is integrated into the horizons of artistic interest, and idealized life goes 
back to being profane. The good side of this discursive meta-position, which is 
a “formatted place” for activating human interpretative, associative and con-
notative potentials, is the permanent semantic actualization of all aspects of the 
world, particularly those that reflect the ways in which social discursive powers 
and dominants manifest themselves through visuality and images.
Yet hanging over these two “positivities” is also a Damoclean sword of “two little 
wrong gestures” with significant consequences. This preservation of the contact 
with the directness of the world can easily slip into the blurring of boundaries 
between art and life, and if “art is life” and “life is art,” then we will very soon 
have neither the authentic form of the first nor the authentic form of the second. 
It may just as easily happen that the constant semantization and actualization 
of objects, facts and contexts, which are never verified in extra-discursive, plas-
tic form, are deformed into a permanent entropic acquiescence with the auto-
matic, fleeting and fatally unchangeable “current of the world.”
Discursive semantizations dispose with endless versions of being acquainted 
with things and informing about them, but due to the meta-positioned distance 
our human consciousness will remain immune to actual situations and their 
consequences. Without the contact with presence, without its resistance, cor-
rectiveness, suffering and pleasure, the nature of creative ideas and even crea-
tive intelligences may essentially change. At the end we thus face the question: 
What exactly do we gain if we turn away from the questionable exaggeration 
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referred to in the metaphysical model of aesthetic idealism as escape into the 
permanent and turn instead toward the equally questionable, though oppositely 
signed exaggeration which the indexed semantization model refers to as escape 
into the fleeting?
Coda
Looking back on all that has been said in this essay on the more than century-
long events that have shaped Western fine/plastic art, it is my opinion that it 
could be condensed not only into the classic, Apollonian-Dionysian binome, 
but also into the classic organic metaphor of vitality—the metaphor of the mod-
ernist “cardiac cycle.” Its expansive, systolic phase is aesthetic idealism, which 
strove to penetrate as deeply as possible into the visual and into the mystical-
mysterious world behind it, while its correlative diastolic phase—currently still 
in progress—is aesthetic anti-idealism, which is linked to the factual and its sec-
ondary semantization. The first phase was directed from the everyday world into 
the epicenter of “spiritualized” plastic art, while the second was directed from 
exclusive and sometimes absolutist plastic spirituality towards life “in the first 
person singular.” On the one side, the cardiology of modernism reached an el-
evated metaphysics of purity and the sublime, which sees and grabs facts from 
their foundations, appearances from their essence, and structure from their 
functions; on the other side, after the break with the fictions of the metaphysical 
“apparition,” it called the creator and viewer back into the grounded, supple 
and confusing real world. In this respect it is clear that these two phenomena 
are not merely two links of historical succession, but rather that they, viewed in 
the long term, form a verifiable, complementary and functional whole.
Because this is how I see things, it is perhaps understandable that in my essay 
I do not speak of “postmodernism” as something that is in progress because 
something else (modernism) has passed.
